IntroductIon
In writing the history of nineteenth-century China, scholars have presented opium as a significant cause of economic decline, social breakdown, and political weakness. The First and Second Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860, respectively) resulted in the semi-colonization of China and inaugurated a century of victimization at the hands of the great powers. The wars also indirectly impacted the neighboring polity of Japan. Forced to abandon its longtime stance of isolationism and open to foreign contact in the 1850s, Japan forestalled the development of a domestic opium economy by strictly prohibiting the import of the drug. Inspired by the negative example of China, this proscription laid the foundations for Japan's rise to modern nationhood alongside the great powers of the West. 1 Although historians have mapped the social and financial consequences of the exclusion of opium from Japan, the ideological ramifications of the ban have remained largely unexplored. This essay argues that opium, through its very absence, provided Japan with a means of conceptualizing its modern development, first as a nation and subsequently as an empire. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the threat of colonization by the West loomed large in the Japanese imagination. To avoid this outcome, policymakers of the Meiji period launched an ambitious campaign to remodel Japan as a rich and strong state. They also sought to differentiate the country from the "Orient." Within the Euro-American mindset, the Orient was an object of imperialism, rendered supine and inferior by collective addiction to opium. 2 Meiji ideologues used the exclusion of opium as the basis for the depiction of Japan as an abstinent nation-state, fundamentally different from, and superior to, the "addicted" polities of Asia. Using opium to positively distinguish itself from the colonized Orient, Japan transmitted its determination to resist conquest by the West and achieve recognition as an independent nation.
Among the first and most notable foreign policy successes of the Meiji state was victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. This unexpected outcome appeared to signal, to both Japanese and Western observers, the superiority of Japan over China, the traditional hegemony of East Asia. The subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki, which recognized Japan's victory, provided the Meiji state with its first colony, the island of Formosa (Taiwan), home to a large population of opium smokers. Having affirmed its nationhood through the exclusion of opium, Japan now faced the challenge of administering an empire of "addicts." 3 The ideological baggage of opium, as well as concern for Japan's international image and financial predicament, resulted in the decision to create a government monopoly over the sale of narcotics, and to provide medical treatment for addiction in the new colony. By the end of the Meiji period, effective suppression of opium both at home and abroad had helped to transform Japan from the object of imperialist designs on the part of great powers, into a legitimate, even model, nation-state and empire.
buIldIng An AbstInent nAtIon In 1853, United States President Millard Fillmore dispatched Commodore Matthew C. Perry to Japan, then in a state of official isolation, to initiate trade and diplomatic relations. The following year, under the implicit threat of force, the Japanese government consented to the first of the so-called "unequal treaties," the Treaty of Kanagawa. This agreement opened five ports and political intercourse between Japan and the United States, and gave Americans the right of extraterritoriality and other privileges. In a critical followup agreement, the U.S. pledged to refrain from exporting opium to Japan. Although many American communities had long profited from the sale of the drug to China, in the decade or so preceding the opening of Japan, society had increasingly turned against the traffic on moral grounds. 4 In the midst of the Second Industrial Revolution, moreover, Americans were primarily interested in creating markets for manufactured goods, and feared that demand for opium might reduce Japan's ability to purchase other products.
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In addition to the economic rationale for voluntary export restrictions, an anti-narcotics stance also allowed the United States to assert an ethical su-periority over Great Britain, the primary source of opium in Asia, and the nineteenth-century world hegemon. The renunciation of opium trafficking contributed to the construction of what historian Ian Tyrrell has referred to as America's "moral empire": a vision of global dominance grounded in networks of non-profit reform organizations of citizens abroad. 6 Frances Willard of the Women's Christian Temperance Union urged the United States to protect "the breezy breath of a new Japan" as it underwent a "magical transformation" in adopting Western civilization.
7 Swayed by voices like Willard's, most of the European powers, including Holland, France, Great Britain, and Russia, also signed treaties prohibiting their nationals from exporting opium to Japan. 8 By contrast, China under the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) did not consent to ban the sale of opium to Japan, citing its own legal inability to restrict the import of the drug. In the late eighteenth century, China had grown rich exporting tea, silk, and ceramics to Great Britain. Reciprocal interest in Western goods, however, was low. Seeking to reverse the unfavorable balance of trade, British entrepreneurs discovered a latent demand for opium in the Chinese market. Having placed much of South Asia under colonial rule, the British East India Company supported the cultivation of poppies, selling opium to China in exchange for goods desired by British consumers. By the 1830s, this so-called "triangular trade" had brought about a balance of exchange unfavorable to China. The Qing government's concern over the huge annual outflow of silver bullion from state coffers resulted in repeated efforts to interdict and enforce bans of the drug, ultimately enmeshing China and Britain in the Opium War (1839-42). 9 In the years after the Opium War, China continued to ban consumption, but illicit demand for "Western smoke" [yangyan] proved an ongoing drain on the imperial treasury. Following another loss at the hands of the European powers in the Second Opium (Arrow) War of 1856-60, the Qing legalized domestic cultivation of opium. Tacitly acknowledging the futility of prohibition, this policy reversal staunched the outflow of silver to Great Britain, while allowing consumption to spread from the coast to the interior of the empire. 10 Jonathan Spence, one of the first historians to study opium smoking as a social phenomenon in late imperial China, has estimated that by 1890, about ten percent of the population, or fifteen million people, were addicted to the narcotic. 11 From the perspective of the Meiji statesmen who guided Japan through its transformation into a modern, Western-style nation, China's relationship with opium was a cautionary tale. 12 Having observed the devastating impact of the drug on the Qing empire, many policymakers wished to proscribe opium completely, but it was too important for use as medicine to reject altogether.
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In 1870, the government passed the Raw Opium Control Regulations [Nama ahen toriatsukai kisoku] and the Laws Concerning the Sale of Smoking Opium [Hanbai ahen en ritsu], requiring doctors and pharmacists to record and report quantities of the drug prescribed to patients. Following a nationwide survey in 1874-75, the government established a comprehensive regulatory system for domestic poppy cultivation and imports. The production of opium was forbidden to all private citizens except a few permit-holders. Most poppies were imported from Persia and Turkey. The newly created Sanitation Bureau processed them into opium paste for distribution through a network of offices in Japan's major cities.
14 Government regulation of opium was remarkably successful in restraining the spread of narcotics consumption among Japanese. "The people do not merely obey the law, but they are proud of it; they would not have it altered if they could," reported an American observer at the end of the Meiji period.
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Although the popular rejection of opium was never as complete as ideologues claimed, the legal restriction of the drug did give rise to a visceral domestic distaste:
Added to the fear of the effects of opium there is that powerful moral lever which society holds in its hands of ostracizing those who disregard its conception of propriety… The Japanese to a man fear opium as we [Westerners] fear the cobra or the rattlesnake, and they despise its victims. There has been no moment in the nation's history when the people have wavered in their uncompromising attitude towards the drug and its use, so that an instinctive hatred of it possesses them… An opium user in Japan would be socially as a leper. 16 In enforcing anti-narcotics regulations, Japanese police were frustrated by Westerners, who enjoyed the privilege of extraterritoriality. They could not be prosecuted in Japanese courts for violating the laws of the land, including anti-opium legislation. Traffickers were remanded to consular courts, where, the Japanese public believed, they often escaped justice. In December 1877, in the most famous instance of opium smuggling by a Western national, customs caught British merchant John Hartley attempting to secret fifteen catties of opium (about 20 pounds) into Japan. Turned over to the British consulate and placed on trial, Hartley defended himself by claiming that the opium was intended for use as medicine (exempted from import restrictions under the Raw Opium Control Regulations of 1870). While awaiting the verdict on his case, Hartley was arrested a second time on evidence of further dealings in opium. In deference to local public opinion, the British placed him on trial again. The case ultimately produced no clear judgment or punishment for Hartley.
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Unlike Western traffickers, whom the Japanese generally dismissed as opportunists, Chinese opium offenders appeared to threaten the domestic population with "contamination." State-builders feared that Japan, like China, would become unable to function as a nation. In 1878, in response to several incidents in which Japanese nationals, predominantly prostitutes, died as a result of using opium allegedly furnished by Chinese, the foreign minister, Terashima Munemori, proposed stricter suppression measures. The 1880 Criminal Code established penalties for the illicit import, manufacture, possession, use, and sale of opium and smoking implements. Japanese who vio-lated these bans were subject to fining and imprisonment. Chinese, singled out as the most likely offenders, could be deported. Terashima also authorized Japanese police to enter the homes of resident Chinese without warrants and make arrests. This measure resulted in several violent confrontations between Chinese migrants and law enforcement personnel. In 1883, in the port city of Nagasaki, police killed one Chinese and wounded five others when a mob attempted to forcibly prevent an arrest. The Qing consulate in Japan protested the incident, but the policy remained unchanged.
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During the remainder of the 1880s and early 1890s, random searches of Chinese neighborhoods, segregated from Japanese residents by law, netted a steady stream of petty violators. In 1887, Chen Langsi was apprehended in the act of smoking in his rental lodging in Nagasaki. Police arrested Chen, confiscated his pipe, and turned him over to the Chinese consulate for deportation.
19 Liang Guangfang, a Chinese migrant in the port of Yokohama, was discovered in his home processing opium paste. 20 An anonymous tip led patrolmen to Ding Abing, a Chinese crewman on a Japanese ship who attempted to transport four "lumps" [kai] of opium ashore.
21 Several other foiled efforts at smuggling involved Chinese on British or American ships passing through Japanese ports on their way from Hong Kong to the West. Many of the accused were conscripted laborers bound for indentured servitude in Europe and America. 22 Rather than sympathizing with the plight of the Chinese, Japanese doctors and policymakers presented them as a threat to the opium-free domestic population. "The Chinese who come to our country to live must be controlled according to our hygiene regulations, and their licentious behavior must be prohibited," concluded one newspaper.
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Given the intimate relationship between narcotics and the Japanese national image, the police and courts spared no effort in bringing opium offenders to justice. Yet in the last two decades of the Meiji period (1890-1911), only 338 individuals were arrested for violations of the ban on handling and consuming opium. Even if Chinese nationals committed all of these offenses (a fact that is not clear from the data), the scale of narcotics crime was extremely limited. 24 By the end of the Meiji period, the threat of opium to the Japanese nation lingered only in the collective imagination.
rulIng An eMpIre of "AddIcts" In 1894, war broke out between China and Japan. The unanticipated victory of the latter intensified the Japanese conviction that addiction had compromised China's ability to function as a nation. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, which restored peace between the two states in 1895, furnished Japan with its first overseas colony, Taiwan, a Qing outpost and the home of a large population of opium smokers. 25 Negotiating the terms of China's surrender, Li Hongzhang warned his Japanese counterpart, Itō Hirobumi, "Formosa will, I think, present immense difficulties in the matter of administration, inasmuch as the people there are deeply addicted to the vicious habit of opium-smoking; and should the island come under Japan's rule, it will cause no small trouble to her." 26 The Japanese Diet subsequently decided to apply the Meiji Constitution, promulgated six years earlier in 1889, to Taiwan. As a result, the Taiwanese became Japanese subjects by law. 27 The "Japanese" were no longer opium-free. Both local and global circumstances of the 1890s, as well as Japan's own ideological construction of narcotics, conditioned the policy alternatives available to the new colonial government as it deliberated its response to opium smoking in Taiwan. In becoming an imperialist power, Japan had joined an exclusive club of Western states. It now sought recognition as a progressive country capable of administering its empire in a suitably "civilized" manner, replacing "backward" native customs with modern hygiene, industry, and development. As one policymaker declared, the prohibition of opium was a matter of "national honor [kokka no meiyo] before the entire world." 28 At the local level, however, the quasi-military Office of the Governor-General [Sōtokufu] struggled to come to terms with an unfamiliar environment and quell indigenous resistance. The transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan from Qing China to Japan ignited sustained and violent opposition throughout the island, resulting in a bloody "pacification" campaign by the Japanese army. Under these hostile conditions, the initial months of colonial rule proved both embarrassing and costly. With proposals to abandon Taiwan under serious consideration in the Japanese Diet, the Governor-General, Kodama Gentarō, turned to Dr. Gotō Shinpei (1857-1929) for help. Though young, Gotō had already built a national reputation based on his rapid progress through the medical field and his role in creating a state health service. He and Kodama, who had worked together during the Sino-Japanese War to design quarantine measures for military veterans, now came together in a collaboration termed the Kodama-Gotō conbi [combination] to devise the framework of colonial control.
During the decade he served in Taiwan, Gotō laid the institutional and ideological foundations of the Japanese empire. Influenced by the German ideology of imperialism, to which he had been exposed during a period of study abroad in Berlin and Munich, Gotō set forth a doctrine of "biological colonialism" [seibutsugaku no gensoku]. Biological colonialism called for Japan, as the ruling power, to acquire an intimate understanding of Taiwanese customs and traditions as the basis for an organic, scientific, and unopposed campaign to modernize the local landscape. In Social Darwinist terms, biological colonialism would improve the "fitness" of the Japanese regime by helping it adapt to its environment. The goal was not to assimilate the Taiwanese, but to transform them from "barbarians" into civilized and enlightened subjects. Gotō's philosophy was a humanitarian [jindōteki] rationalization of imperialism that cultivated legitimacy for Japanese rule through a display of concern for the welfare of indigenes, including opium smokers. 29 At the request of Itō Hirobumi, Gotō undertook a thorough survey of the land and customs of Taiwan, including narcotics consumption. The investigation counted approximately 170,000 opium smokers, representing over six percent of the population. 30 Quantification fed calls for action to contain opium, but colonial policymakers were divided over the best way to proceed. Although they wished to encourage Japanese immigration to Taiwan, the better to subdue and extract resources from the island, they also feared that military and civilian colonists might be led astray by the example of the opiumsmoking indigene -just as their counterparts in the metropole had feared the transmission of the habit from Chinese migrants. Immediately upon receiving authority from Tokyo, the Sōtokufu declared that any Taiwanese caught supplying opium to Japanese troops would be punished with death. 31 Gotō Shinpei's recommendations for narcotics regulation in the colony, set forth in his November 1895 Taiwan ahen seido ni kansuru iken sho [Memorandum on the Formosan Opium Policy] acknowledged the fear of contamination: "As the Japanese go to the island in large numbers and come in close contact with the natives, and as some of them may contract the evil habit, it is easy to see that there is a serious danger of it spreading into Japan… Therefore the adoption of suppression measures in Formosa is very urgent." 32 The most obvious way to prevent the spread of smoking to Japanese troops and civilians was the immediate and absolute prohibition of local opium consumption [genkin shugi]. Gotō, however, favored a gradual policy of suppression [zenkin shugi]. In a follow-up memorandum, he outlined a plan for the government to establish a monopoly over the supply of opium in the colony. This institution would dispense limited quantities of the drug to licensed individual smokers, reducing the amount over time and enabling users to give up the habit with a minimum of suffering from withdrawal. The monopoly would also provide a temporary source of revenue to the Office of the Governor-General, allowing Taiwan to become financially self-sufficient from Tokyo. In the mid-1890s, the administration of the colony consumed as much as seven percent of the metropolitan budget. 33 In addition to the financial advantages of gradual suppression, Gotō also suggested that the institution of the opium monopoly might serve as a source of colonial prestige. By the mid-1890s, all of the colonial administrations of Southeast Asia, including the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, Portuguese Macao, and British Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaya, had established control over the opium market. For the great powers, commitment to saving the imperial subject from the ravages of narcotics was part of the ideological justification of empire. In fact, in many colonies the opium monopoly served to perpetuate and expand consumption, due to its utility in raising revenue for the state. Yet although the institution tended to subvert rather than support its alleged goal of gradually suppressing opium, the imperial powers nonetheless deemed it a hallmark of "civilized" and enlightened government. 34 In view of his adherence to biological colonialism, with its emphasis on developing policies to match local conditions rather than universal criteria, Gotō was skeptical of applying European colonial practices to Taiwan wholesale. 35 Yet he also believed that, by implementing the prohibition strategy of the great powers, Japan could demonstrate its ability to meet the norms of imperial rule.
The chief civil administrator of Taiwan, Mizuno Jun, supported Gotō's idea of an opium monopoly. Though the two men often disagreed on matters of colonial policy, they came together over the matter of narcotics regulation. In 1896, Mizuno submitted a memorandum to the metropolitan government espousing gradual suppression. From the outset of colonial rule, Mizuno wrote, Japan had deplored "the tragic reality of opium poisoning" taking place among the Chinese. Narcotics were "the ruin of four hundred million people… and the country [ahen bōkoku]."
36 Japan now had the opportunity to save the Taiwanese from this fate. In extirpating the habit of opium smoking, however, Mizuno suggested proceeding with caution: "In getting rid of a hundred-year habit, we must work gradually so as not to provoke bad feelings."
37 With resistance to Japanese rule ongoing, he hesitated to furnish an additional pretext for protest by intervening immediately and intimately in local customs. In his understanding, Many of the Chinese officers and men who had been garrisoned in the island and were dissatisfied with its cession to Japan joined the rebels; and these induced peaceful citizens to join them by declaring that if Formosa came under Japanese rule, opium-smoking would be strictly forbidden and thus the inhabitants would be permanently deprived of the pleasure of opium-smoking, and therefore should now oppose the Japanese Government. The opium question, then, was not merely a question relating to opium only, but one with great influence on the subjugation of the rebels; and this only added to the difficulty of its solution.
38
In response to critics who feared interim transmission of opium smoking to Japanese settlers in Taiwan, Mizuno countered that any stricter measure to ban the drug would lead to "the exact opposite result." 39 Mizuno also argued that the Japanese were an "active" race, drawn to the stimulant of alcohol, and biologically insulated against cravings for the soporific of opium. In making this contention, he referenced the belief, common throughout the nineteenth-century world, that alcohol and opium represented the essence of the "West" and the "Orient," respectively. This framework rested on the assumption that all societies demanded some type of consciousness-altering agent, which could be arranged in a hierarchy that reflected the relative status of the consuming nations. Leading figures of the medical world lent scientific credibility to this hypothesis. Dr. Sakai Yoshio of the Tokyo Imperial University Medical College maintained that the consumption of sake marked the Japanese as an "active" race, in contrast to the Chinese, a "lethargic" race that smoked opium. 40 Sakai did not refer to the chemical properties of alcohol and narcotics in determining their comparative value. Rather, as Chinese literature specialist Keith McMahon has observed, "the vilification and suppression of opium as opposed to alcohol… have everything to do with drawing lines between fit and unfit states of being." 41 Although some Japanese in Taiwan had been caught trafficking in opium, Mizuno assured his readers that these offenders were not using the drug themselves. "Alcohol, rather than opium, is the enemy we Japanese must combat," he stated. 42 Gotō even sug-gested eliminating taxes on sake to encourage the Taiwanese to drink instead of smoke opium. 43 Against the consensus of Mizuno and Gotō, some bureaucrats advocated the adoption of immediate suppression measures. Katō Hisayuki of the Home Ministry Sanitation Bureau feared that allowing opium smoking to continue, even in the short term, would drain both individual and national strength. He also objected to the opium monopoly for prioritizing the financial benefit of Japan over the mission to civilize the Taiwanese. He called upon his country to "lay bare before the world our government's principle of eschewing profit [hi shū'nyū shugi]" and to "follow the path of philanthropy and righteousness [hakuai kōdō no shugi]." 44 In Katō's view, swift suppression of opium would "make Japan's honor shine even more brightly… beneath the gaze of the international community." 45 He believed that the abstinent nation-state of Japan simply could not accommodate an addicted colony: "Japan and opium are fundamentally incompatible. Where the Japanese go, they must get rid of opium." 46 The debate over narcotics policy spilled into the public forum. Naitō Konan, the editor of Taiwan's new Japanese-language newspaper, the Taiwan nippō [Taiwan daily news], made opium a headline issue. Naitō was already a Sinologist of some renown when he arrived in Taiwan in the spring of 1897. Under his direction, the Taiwan nippō regularly published tallies of opium smokers, traffickers, and dens in the colony. The paper also reported on the state of anti-opium knowledge abroad. When Great Britain dispatched a survey team to its colonies to investigate the extent of consumption, Naitō applauded English "royalty, nobility, scholars, and trained specialists" for taking an interest in the problem. 47 Naitō believed that the eradication of "shocking" practices like opium smoking would create a more favorable environment for Japanese settlement in Taiwan. He, like Gotō, upheld Japan's humanitarian responsibility to improve the racial fitness of the Taiwanese. In a series of front-page editorials on "the great purpose of our administration in Taiwan [Taiwan seiji no dai mokuteki]," Naitō expressed his conviction that "in addition to ruling [the colony] for the profit of Japanese settlers, we must also take the welfare of the natives into account in our plans; and in order to encourage progress according to the principles of a civilized country, we must seek to change, little by little, the ways of the indigenes." In the editor's view, gradual rather than abrupt change was more humane, practical, and likely to succeed. 48 At the end of January 1897, the Yomiuri Shinbun [Daily Yomiuri], a leading newspaper in the Japanese home islands, published a series of editorials by Ishiguro Tadanori, chief medical inspector for the imperial army in Taiwan, summarizing the argument in favor of gradual prohibition. Ishiguro acknowledged that a strict and immediate ban on opium was ideal for preventing the contamination of Japan and the Japanese by opium. Nonetheless, as a doctor, he declared it "un-benevolent [fujin]" to sacrifice the health of the opiumsmoking minority for the sake of protecting the abstinent majority. 49 If the Japanese government cracked down on consumption too abruptly, Ishiguro pointed out, many smokers were likely to die from the agony of withdrawal. 50 Instead of exacerbating the local security situation with an unpopular policy, he proposed cultivating the devotion [shinpuku] of the Taiwanese to the new government by stretching prohibition over a longer time frame. As an interim measure, Ishiguro suggested restricting the immigration of opium-smoking mainland Chinese into Taiwan, where they might encourage backsliding among the local population. 51 In advocating gradual prohibition, Ishiguro also appealed to Japan's desire to emulate the great powers of the West, which, as Gotō had noted, all maintained opium monopolies in their Southeast Asian colonies. 52 Alongside Ishiguro's editorial, the Yomiuri Shinbun announced the promulgation of the Taiwan Opium Law [Taiwan ahen rei], which came into effect in April 1897. The legislation enumerated a series of regulations regarding the sourcing and marketing of opium through the institution of a state monopoly. By 1901, the Office of the Governor-General had established a formal Opium Monopoly Bureau [Ahen senbai-kyoku] to fully realize control over supply on the island. To sell opium on its behalf, the regime issued licenses to approximately a thousand Taiwanese elites. 53 Many of these newly authorized petty distributors already served the colonial government as representatives of the indigenous community police system [Chinese, baojia; Japanese, hokō]. As intermediaries between the Sōtokufu and the Taiwanese population, they helped to stabilize Japanese control. 54 To regulate consumption, the Opium Monopoly Bureau issued permits to all Taiwanese smokers, redeemable at intervals for a fixed, theoretically falling, quantity of narcotics. By under-pricing licit opium relative to smuggled opium, the authorities furnished smokers with an economic incentive to join the registry. Applicants required the approval of a doctor, but beyond the establishment of a minimum age of twenty, the physical conditions that qualified a patient for a daily ration of opium were not elaborated. To prevent more people from adopting the habit of smoking, the government stipulated a fixed time period during which permits would be issued. The Office of the Governor-General claimed that the Taiwanese were delighted by the law: "When the declaration respecting the grant of licences for smoking for medical reasons was issued and followed by the Opium Ordinance, it was received with great joy not only by the old confirmed smokers themselves, but also by the general public." 55 Whether this "great joy" was genuine or only imagined on the part of the colonizers, the regime found compliance satisfactory. Arrests for violations of the Opium Law dwindled from 1,046 in 1901, to 56 in 1905. 56 In the pages of the Taiwan nippō, Naitō depicted the Opium Law as a humanitarian Japanese rescue of the "backward" Taiwanese. Upon the implementation of the legislation, he wrote, "Originally opium smoking harmed the people of the Qing empire, and narcotics use sapped the nation's strength. Naturally, in our country opium use is strictly prohibited. Now the Opium Law will, over a period of many years, also save the lives of the Taiwanese from the peril of drugs." 57 Although Naitō had once believed that "the predilection of the natives for opium smoking is stronger than the attraction of the Japanese for alcohol," in early 1898 he debuted a more hopeful stance, observing that drinking establishments had grown more numerous over the past year, as the Taiwanese, "in the manner of Japanese," gravitated towards the pleasures of sake. 58 Meanwhile, journalist Takekoshi Yosaburō reported that Japanese migrants were successfully resisting the negative example of their indigenous neighbors: "I heard… that among the 50,000 Japanese who live in Formosa, only one in the Shinko District, two in the Taito District, and one in the Taihoku District are habitual smokers. There is also one in the Toroku District who is suspected of being an opium smoker. When I heard this I could not help feeling proud of my race." 59 Where abstinence from narcotics had once distinguished the Japanese from a larger population of "Orientals," it now came to function as a marker of the superiority of the ruling elite over the colonial subject.
The alleged danger of the transmission of opium smoking from the Taiwanese to the Japanese having been contained, the colonial government adopted measures to forestall the re-introduction of the drug by migrant Chinese. Prior to Japan's acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, large numbers of mainland Chinese, particularly from the coastal province of Fujian, came annually to the island as settlers. The Qing government encouraged this demographic redistribution, which relieved rural overpopulation and strengthened Chinese control over Taiwan. Although the Sōtokufu mistrusted mainland migrants, the labor demands of new colonial enterprises, including plantations, mines, and factories, soon came to outstrip local supply. The Japanese colonial authorities accordingly developed procedures for admitting a limited number of laborers at specified ports, while excluding "undesirable" elements, including opium smokers and vagrants. Prior to departing from the mainland, Chinese were to be quarantined overnight by labor procurement companies. These enterprises were responsible for issuing landing certificates specifying the name, age, birthplace, occupation, sea vessel, and motives of the migrant. They also screened out individuals suspected of addiction, deporting overlooked cases at their own cost. 60 Despite this surveillance, Chinese opium users continued to trouble the colonial authorities of Taiwan. In 1905, the Sōtokufu commenced issuing smoking permits to a limited number of Qing migrants. From 1905 to 1938, they comprised, on average, less than two percent of the total number of registered users.
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The permit system rested on an implicit belief, common throughout the turn-of-century world, that constricting the supply of substances would naturally curb demand. Although doctors such as Gotō and Ishiguro expressed concern for the health of smokers, the Taiwan Opium Law made no explicit provision for medical assistance in the detoxification process. Physicians, however, soon began to consider dependence on narcotics from the perspec-tive of modern scientific (i.e., Western) medicine. During the Meiji period, the institutionalization of Western-style laboratories and hospitals, the twin pillars of scientific medicine, came to symbolize the right to rule of the government, the fitness of the population, and the "civilization and enlightenment" of the modern nation-state. 62 The transmission of scientific medicine to the empire likewise reflected a quest for international status, power, and legitimacy. 63 Although Japanese doctors had almost no experience in treating addiction at home, those who migrated to Taiwan at the outset of colonial rule soon came to view dependence on narcotics as a medical problem to be studied and cured. The regime supported this project in the hope that helping smokers to detoxify would win the gratitude and loyalty of the Taiwanese. In late 1897, migrant physicians from the metropole formed the Taipei Medical Society [Taihoku igaku shakai] and announced their intention of studying the pathology of addicts. Already, the association claimed, over one hundred opium smokers per day were showing up at the Japanese government clinic, the Taipei Hospital [ Taihoku Iin] . 64 In 1900, public physicians [kōi] treated 48 patients for dependence on opium and oral overdose (a common means of suicide).
65 These doctors, mostly Japanese, were dispersed throughout the island to discharge hygiene measures at the district level. Though not employed by the government, they received state subsidies for their work. Public doctors generally sought to alleviate withdrawal symptoms in patients by administering an opiate-based analgesic. As a result, in many cases the "cure" simply shifted addiction from opium to another substance, such as morphine. In 1900, public doctors claimed to have cured only 9 patients. 67 To increase treatment success and improve health conditions in Taiwan more generally, the colonial government commissioned the Taiwan Local and Contagious Disease Investigation Committee [Taiwan chihōbyō oyobi densenbyō chōsa iinkai]. The committee submitted its two-part report, "On the treatment of opium addicts," in 1900. Beginning with the premise that "the fact that addicts should be saved is obvious," the team proposed mandatory, segregated treatment for opium smokers. The report also recommended the allocation of government funding to support research on addiction in public hospitals.
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Doctors were encouraged to circulate their findings widely for the benefit of the general medical community. The Taiwan nippō published several demographic studies of opium smokers and their symptoms. 69 The Taiwan Igakkai Zasshi [Journal of the Taiwan Medical Society], a Japanese-language scientific periodical published monthly in Taipei beginning in 1902, also served as a forum for the dissemination of information about addiction. In 1903, Dr. Kimura Kingo's "First report on the physique of addicts" assessed the physical characteristics of one hundred Taiwanese opium smokers. From questioning this sample, Kimura surmised that a majority of narcotics users had taken up the habit between the ages of twenty and thirty. The modal age of consumers was between thirty and forty years old. Ninety percent had started smoking for medical reasons. At the turn of the century, opium, which suppressed diar-rhea and inhibited coughing, was one of few known treatments for common scourges such as cholera and tuberculosis. It was also widely used to relieve pain from injury and chronic disease. To Kimura, however, the use of opium as medicine reflected the ignorance typical of unskilled laborers, the dominant occupational group in the sample. Comparing the smokers to a control population of abstinent Japanese, Kimura found the Taiwanese less vigorous in terms of both height and weight. Many of the doctor's successors, as well as writers outside the medical discipline, similarly compared unhealthy colonial subject bodies with robust Japanese to validate claims of Japanese racial superiority and fitness for imperial rule.
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Although other topics, such as vaccination, soon supplanted addiction as the focus of Kimura's research, he left behind a cohort of specialists to take his place in the field. These included two Japanese doctors, Inagaki Chōjirō and Sakagami Kōzō; and three Taiwanese doctors: Wang Zhenqian, Lin Qingyue, and Meng Tiancheng. 71 In contrast to the empires of the West, which tended to consider scientific medical knowledge the prerogative of the colonizer, Japan sought to include local physicians in the quest to build public health in Taiwan. Lin and Meng, who collaborated on several papers, were educated at the medical school established by the imperial government. Lin was a first author or collaborator on three separate studies of registered opium users and their treatment in Taipei in 1908. 72 Meng was an early mentor of Tsungming Tu [Japanese, Do Sōmei], a Japanese-educated Taiwanese who became one of the world's leading researchers and clinicians on opium addiction in the 1930s and 1940s. 73 At the turn of the century, the quest to understand dependence on opium from a scientific medical perspective derived urgency from a competing cure offered by the Feiluan Jingbihui [Society of the flying phoenix and the divine will]. This quasi-religious association represented one of the first organized efforts in Taiwan to treat opium addiction. The Feiluan Jingbihui originated in southeast China and reached Taiwan in 1897. Members seeking relief from opium cravings placed a pipe in front of an enshrined deity and requested divine assistance. After this ceremony, they received a quantity of holy water, containing incense, ashes, and opium. Supplicants drank a portion of the water immediately, and retained the rest for home use. They were told their cravings would disappear when the water had been completely consumed. By 1901, the Feiluan Jingbihui had established branches throughout Taiwan, attracting adherents among elites as well as common people. A survey by the Japanese administration in September of that year found that the organization had helped 34,370 individuals to quit smoking, out of a total opium user population of 169,064. Although the Feiluan Jingbihui mission to cure addiction was purportedly consonant with the aims of the Sōtokufu, in reality, the colonial government viewed the movement as a threat to the profitability of its new monopoly. Moreover, physicians, including Taiwanese doctors trained in scientific medicine, objected to the society as a vestige of traditionalism and backwardness that directly contravened their ambition to modernize public health in Taiwan. Casting the organization as a religious front for anti-Japanese activities, the government moved to suppress it. 74 Ironically, following the elimination of the Feiluan Jingbihui, colonial doctors largely lost interest in the problem of opium addiction. Having contained the challenge to scientific medicine, most physicians turned their attention to the ongoing threat of tropical diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever. The number of addiction cases treated annually by public doctors dropped from 675 to 28. 75 For nearly two decades, the Taiwan Igakkai Zasshi did not publish any research on opium. 76 Not until the late 1920s, under very different social and political conditions, did physicians and the state once again collaborate in the research and treatment of addiction. The institutionalization of state control of the narcotics market in Japan, following its justification in the empire, was one of the first but by no means only instances in which innovation in the colonies inspired change at home.
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Under the new regulations, opium purchased abroad by government agents was to be processed in a central facility and funneled to local authorities, from which licensed pharmacists might acquire it for sale to consumers. Domestically grown poppies were subject to inspection by the Tokyo Hygiene Lab; if their morphine content was deemed adequate, the government would purchase them from cultivators for a fixed price. Crops that did not meet government standards would be destroyed. 79 Violations were infrequent: between the establishment of the government monopoly in 1897, and 1911, the last full calendar year of the Meiji period, the judicial system prosecuted a mere 280 infractions. All but 40 defendants were sentenced to imprisonment or hard labor. 80 Given the perception that Japan's opium-free status was essential to its development as a modern nation and empire, the judicial system remained disinclined to show leniency to convicted offenders.
In Taiwan, by contrast, the opium economy thrived under the state monopoly. Although Gotō had intended the institution to become anachronistic as smokers died out or abandoned their habit, desire for the profits of narcotics sales blocked any sincere attempt on the part of the Office of the GovernorGeneral to limit consumption. By raising the price of opium, the Monopoly Bureau increased its receipts each year for two decades following the passage of the Opium Law. 81 Unable to afford smoking opium, many users turned to cheaper substances such as cocaine, morphine, and heroin. By 1929, annual per capita consumption of refined substances reached 0.1 grams. 82 Nonetheless, the government touted falling numbers of registered smokers as evidence that its enlightened rule had extirpated the opium market. From a peak of 169,064 licensed users, comprising 6.3 percent of the population of Taiwan, the number of registered smokers declined to 98,987 in 1910, 48,012 in 1920, and 23,237 in 1930 (0.5 percent of the population). 83 Natural attrition accounted for much of this decline, claiming an average of approximately 7,500 lives annually between 1899 and 1911. 84 In the early twentieth century, China and the West accepted Japan's apparently swift success in suppressing the opium market at face value. In 1906, the Qing empire adopted a six-year policy of gradual suppression, declaring its intention to "Cut [opium] off, root and branch… Know the shame of not being like Japan." 85 Only a few years after the passage of the Opium Law, Americans also took note of Japan's achievements in Taiwan. Having acquired possession of the Philippines from Spain in 1898, the United States sought a prototype for narcotics policy in its new colony. The Philippine Opium Commission, appointed in 1906 to investigate frameworks of control, recommended Taiwan as a model for American policy What has been done during the past eight years by this quick-witted, enterprising nation for the benefit of the Formosans… has resulted in a state of peace such as probably the history of the island has never before known, even temporarily. Not least in the Japanese campaign of progress has been the attempt to grapple with the opium problem and solve it so far as it touches Formosan life.
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As early Meiji policymakers had predicted from their observation of Qing China, the exclusion of opium might well have made the difference between development as an independent state, and colonization or sovereignty compromised by European or American domination. Within fifty years, the establishment of an effective system of narcotics regulation had helped to transform Japan from the object of imperialist designs on the part of great powers, into a legitimate, even model, nation-state and empire.
University of Colorado at Boulder miriam.kingsberg@colorado.edu endnotes

